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Abstract
Increasing threats from worms in the internet continue to be a challenge for current content-based Network Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDS). Worms use different obfuscation techniques (You & Yim 2010) to evade detection and if the worm’s signature is
not previously known, such systems fail. This paper proposes the use of behavioral signatures for network intrusion detection. The
different infection phases exhibited by a worm can be used to characterize its network behaviour. Such behaviour of worms can be
captured in the proposed scheme by using behavioural signatures.
c⃝ 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Department of Computer Science &
Engineering, National Institute of Technology Rourkela.
Keywords: Worm Detection; Behavioral Signature;
1. Introduction
Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Botnets are all part of a class of software called malware. Malware or malicious
code (malcode) is short for malicious software. It is code or software that is speciﬁcally designed to damage, disrupt,
steal, or in general inﬂict some other bad or illegitimate action on data, hosts, or networks ( N.d.a). A worm is a
type of malware which replicates itself over computer systems using different propagation methods (Weaver, Paxson,
Staniford & Cunningham 2003). In this paper, however, we deal speciﬁcally with network worms and their detection.
Unlike viruses, which need a target program to execute, a worm executes independently and may or may not need
user intervention. This characteristic is what makes a worm particularly damaging and causes it to spread over the
internet into private networks. Therefore, it becomes necessary that Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are
effectively developed to detect worms without raising large number raise false alarms. Current NIDSs mainly rely
on content based signatures for detection purposes. Signature based systems are useful when a threat is previously
known. A signature contains information such as port numbers, invalid ﬂag bit combinations in TCP segments, byte
sequences or strings in network payload which are obtained from previously known threats. In an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), these signatures are stored in a database and are matched against incoming network trafﬁc. This type
of a system does not care how a worm discovers its target or how it propagates between two hosts, i.e it does not
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take into account the network behaviour of a worm. They scan every packet and look for a speciﬁc regular expression
representing a worm’s payload. Such systems ( N.d.b) cannot detect unknown attacks and the signatures can be
evaded with slight variations of the payload using obfuscation nd encryption techniques. Also, for each worm a
signature requires an entry in the database and each of them requires to be matched with incoming packets. This can
make the system computationally intensive and thus making the IDS vulnerable to Dos attacks (Li, Salour & Su 2008).
In this paper, we propose a system which uses behavioral signatures for worm detection. Each worm exhibits a
deﬁnite communication pattern as it propagates between hosts in a network. During each infection phase (Target
Finding, Propagation, Activation, Payload Execution), a sequence of ordered network events are observed in the
communication link connecting the attacker and victim and this sequence must be satisﬁed for each link in the network
for a worm to propagate. Such patterns can be used to uniquely identify a worm and we refer to them as behavioural
signatures. There are primarily two beneﬁts of using behavioural signatures:
a) A single behavioral signature may be used to detect a group of worms.
b) Are not vulnerable to evasion techniques which apply to content based signatures.
Each sample in a worm family exhibits some common communication pattern as it propagates in a network. As a
result, a single signature may be used to detect more that one worm in the same family, if not the entire worm family.
They are not vulnerable to obfuscation and encryption based evasion techniques as they do not rely on the payload the
worm carries. In this paper, we propose a framework for detecting worms using behavioral signatures. The rest of the
paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work, different infection phases of a worm are discussed in
Section 3. The proposed scheme is discussed in Section 4. The paper concludes with a discussion on future work in
Section 5.
2. Related Work
The concept using malware behaviour detection is not new. Host based approaches (Kolbitsch, Comparetti,
Kruegel, Kirda, Zhou & Wang N.d.), involve constructing behavioral signatures by observing information ﬂow be-
tween system calls. Dagon et al. (Dagon, Qin, Gu, Lee, Grizzard, Levine & Owen 2004) discusses an behavioral
approach which uses honeypots for worm detection. The most relevant work was done by Ellis et al. (Ellis, Aiken,
Attwood & Tenaglia 2004), which proposed a worm propagation model for worm detection in a local area network.
The model relies on behavioural patterns a worm exhibits during its propagation which has been adopted in our pro-
posed framework. However, (Ellis et al. 2004) assumes the existence of behavioural signatures without discussing the
process of signature generation and signature matching. Also, it does not discuss the process of capturing, processing
and storing packets which is crucial for such a system. The focus of this paper is to cover these inadequate areas.
3. Worm Infection Phases
A worm usually exploits security or policy ﬂaws in widely used services. During its entire infection process a
worm basically goes through four phases viz Target Finding, Propagation, Activation and Payload Execution
A worm’s ﬁrst need is to ﬁnd targets. There are a number of ways by which a worm can ﬁnd its targets. There can
be pre-deﬁned list of targets which is hard-coded into the worm. There are also blind scanning techniques which have
no previous knowledge of victims.
Weaver et al.(Weaver et al. 2003) describes three schemes for worm propagation: self-carried, second channel and
embedded. In self carried worms, the worm payload is transferred by itself, as part of the infection process. In second
channel, after ﬁnding the target, the worm ﬁrst goes into the target, and then downloads the worm’s payload from
the Internet or a previously infected machine through a backdoor. Transmission of the worm from one host to the
other can take place using UDP or TCP protocols. All worms using TCP for transmission need to complete the TCP
three way handshake. UDP is connectionless, so UDP worms do not require the connection establishment process
and hence can spread very fast and its speed is limited only by the network bandwidth.
After the worm has been transferred, it gets activated. The process of activation can be human triggered or au-
tonomous. Human based approaches mostly rely on social engineering techniques. For example: Email worms may
use a message saying ”Download copyrighted material” along with a malicious link or an attachment.
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Fig. 1. Blaster Worm: Infection phases
A payload is code in the worm designed to do more than just spread. A payload might delete ﬁles on a host system
or send documents via email. However, modern worms are designed to spread stealthily and they do not attempt to
alert systems as they propagate and hence, they do not contain such payloads. A common payload for these worms is
to install a backdoor in the infected computer to allow the creation of a zombie to be controlled by the worm author.
3.0.1. Example: Blaster Worm
The ﬁrst variant of Blaster worm was observed on August 11, 2003. Since then, a number of other variants were
observed in the internet. The worm exploited a buffer overﬂow vulnerability in DCOM RPC (MS03-026) ( N.d.c),
which existed in all Windows XP and Windows 2000 operating systems, released in July 2003. The worm causes the
system to reboot in order to launch ’msblast.exe’ (the main worm executable) immediately. The compromised host
then starts listening on UDP port 69 for TFTP connections from newly compromised systems. Figure 1 illustrates
each step in a Blaster worm’s infection process between an attacker and a victim. The infection steps are described as
follows:
1. In the ﬁrst step, a TCP connect probe is sent to port 135. If the victim does not exist or port 135 is down,
connection attempts are made inﬁnitely.
2. If the three way handshake was completed and connection was successfully established, exploit code is sent to
port 135. If the attack was successful, a remote shell (cmd.exe is bound to port 4444) is opened on TCP port
4444.
3. Next, appropriate commands are sent to the newly created remote shell to download a copy of the worm from
the attacking host. The download takes place over UDP port 69 using the TFTP protocol.
The above steps are repeated for each link along the worm propagates.
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Table 1. Events and their composition
Type Composition
CON SYN,
−−−−−−
SYNACK,ACK
CLS FIN,
−−
ACK,
−−
FIN,ACK
RST RST
UDP −
ICMP −
4. Proposed Scheme
4.1. Behavioral Signatures
A behavioural signature, for a worm, can be deﬁned as a subset of the sequence of network events executed by a
worm, which uniquely identiﬁes it. Thus, each worm has a unique behavioural speciﬁcation. During the exploitation
phase, when a worm tries to exploit a vulnerable service the observed event sequence deviates from what is observed
during normal access of the same service. Even for worms exploiting a common vulnerable service, the sequence of
events may be different. A worm’s behaviour is totally dependent on how the worm developer decides to implement
it. As a result, the probing mechanism, exploitation mechanism and payload contents are entirely implementation
speciﬁc. For an instance, probing mechanism used to probe a remote service may be a TCP SYN probe in one worm
implementation and TCP connect in the other. Also, there exists a dependency between each event observed in and
between each infection phase. For example, in the case of Blaster worm, a TCP connect probe is ﬁrst sent to port
135 on the remote host. Once targeted and if successfully exploited, a remote shell service is started on TCP port
4444 on the same host. Instructions are then sent to port 4444 by the worm agent to download its replica using the
TFTP protocol. Here, the TCP connect event must precede any trafﬁc to and from port 4444 and TFTP trafﬁc must be
observed after a connection to port 4444 has been established.
4.1.1. Representation
A behavioural signature is composed of UDP, TCP and ICMP events is some deﬁnite order. Table 1, contains a
list of different events and their representation. We consider a signature to be a string of such events. For example,
Blaster worm has the following behavioural signature:
CON1 RST1 CON2
−−
UDPUDP RST2
CON1 is identiﬁed by < IPA,?, IPB,135 >, where IPA and IPB are the attacker and victim IPs respectively. ? repre-
sents a variable source port which is known to differ between different variants of the worm. 135 is the destination
port. In a similar manner, RST1, CON2, UDP and RST2 are identifed. Please note that, − in −−UDP refers to direction
UDP packet, i.e, the identiﬁer is < IPB,?, IPA,69>
4.2. System Architecture
Figure 2, illustrates the basic architecture used in our proposed scheme. At the hardware level, all packets are
received by the NIC (Network Interface Card). Packet Capturing is the process of collecting data as it propagates
in a network. Sniffers are an example of packet capture systems. The captured data is passed to the preprocessor
which is discussed in section 4.3. We assume a standard Ethernet network in our scenario. The detector matches
behavioral signatures stored in a database against events generated by the preprocessor. A sandbox environment is
used to execute different worm variants and extract common features from their respective communication patterns.
The generated signature is then stored in the database.
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Fig. 2. Proposed Scheme: Architecture
Table 2. Data Structure: Packet Recording Buffer
Variable Description
Type The event type: TCP/UDP/ICMP
SrcIP Source IP
DstIP Destination IP
SrcPort Source Port
DstPort Destination Port
State The connection state
Time Time of occurrence of the event
4.3. Preprocessor
The preprocessor handles three types of events: TCP, UDP and ICMP events. The primary tasks performed by the
preprocessor are Packet Recording, Connection Tracking and Event Trace generation
First, the preprocessor performs packet decoding. Packet decoding involves converting raw packet data into proto-
col speciﬁc information. Since, each protocol has a different header format, a separate decoder has to be implemented
for each protocol. Decoded packet data can then be used for further processing such as error checking, data validation,
connection tracking and event generation.
4.3.1. Packet Recording
After a packet has been decoded, it is checked for errors. If an invalid packet is found it is discarded without any
further processing, else it needs to be processed further to determine if an event corresponding to the packet is ready
to appear in the trace. Before further processing can be carried out on the decoded data, it needs to be stored in buffer
in the memory. The idea behind using a buffer for packet recording is able to provide the detector with trafﬁc from the
past. With this information in hand, the detector can refer to past events to conﬁrm if an attack has happened. A brute
force approach would be to store all packets and when the buffer is ﬁlled discard older packets, and ﬁll in the new
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Fig. 3. Flowchart: Packet recording
packets. More efﬁcient methods for packet recording are described in (Kornexl 2005). Table 2, illustrates the data
structure for storing information the buffer and ﬁgure 3 describes the process of storing decoded packet information.
4.3.2. Connection Tracking
Each protocol is handled differently in this process. TCP is a connection oriented protocol, which means the two
applications using TCP must establish a TCP connection with each other before they can exchange data. Each TCP
segment contains the source and destination port number to identify the sending and receiving application. These
two values, along with the source and destination IP addresses in the IP header, uniquely identify each connection.
The sequence number is used to identify the byte in the stream of data being sent by the sender to the receiver and
it represents the ﬁrst byte of data in the segment. If we consider the stream of bytes is being transferred between
two applications TCP assigns each byte with a sequence number. The acknowledgement number contains the next
sequence number that the sender of the acknowledgement expects to receive. There are six ﬂag bits (URG, ACK,
PUSH, RST, SYN, FIN) in the TCP header and more than one can be turned on at the same time. The preprocessor
uses the above components of TCP segment for processing incoming TCP trafﬁc. A TCP connection between two
hosts starts in a null state, where there is no connection, and then proceeds through a series of states until a connection
is established and goes through another series of states whenever connection is closed or reset. Based on these states
different information can be obtained about a TCP connection. We use this state information for connection tracking
and generating various TCP events. A connection is always initiated with the TCP 3-way handshake, which establishes
a connection over which data will be sent. This process begins with a client sending a TCP segment to the server with
SYN ﬂag enabled and an initial sequence number. The server then a replies with a TCP segment where both SYN and
ACK ﬂag bits are set and the acknowledgement number is set to to the client’s initial sequence number plus one. The
server also sets it’s sequence number in the sequence number ﬁeld. Finally a TCP segment with ACK bit set is sent by
the client with its acknowledgement number set to the previously received sequence number incremented by one. At
this point the connection is established and data can’t be sent and received between the two ends. Whenever the above
sequence is observed in we say a CON event has occurred and is appended to the output event trace. All TCP data
packets are ignored in our scheme. Handling UDP and ICMP protocols are much simpler compared to TCP. UDP is a
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connectionless protocol. Unlike TCP it doesn’t involve connection establishment or connection termination. Also, it
lacks sequencing of data. Receiving two UDP datagrams in a speciﬁc order does not say anything about the order in
which they were sent. An UDP connection is identiﬁed by the four tuple: Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP and
Destination Port. If a UDP datagram is captured a UDP event is said to have occurred and is directly appended to the
event trace without further processing.
ICMP is an IP layer protocol. It is primarily used for network diagnosis. ICMP messages are usually acted on by
either the IP layer or a transport layer protocol (TCP or UDP). In our scheme, only ICMP Echo request and reply is
handled. Although, if needed, other ICMP types such as Time-stamp request and reply, Information request and reply
and Address mask request and reply can also be integrated. Whenever an ICMP echo request or reply is captured, it
is directly passed to the event trace along with the source and destination IPs.
A generated event in the trace has the following format:
EVT SRCIP SPORT DSTIP DPORT
EVT represents an event generated by the preprocessor, SRCIP represents the event’s source IP, SPORT represents
the source port, DSTIP represents destination IP and DPORT represents the destination port. The event trace is passed
to a log ﬁle for later analysis.
4.4. Signature Matching
Each signature consists of sequence of events and and each event has an associated set of attributes, in terms of
IPs and Ports. The detection algorithm relies on these events and their attributes for matching. Algorithm 1, describes
steps involved in the signature matching process.
Algorithm 1 Signature Matching
INPUT: Events Generated by Preprocessor, Signature
OUTPUT: Event Log, Detection Alert
1: SigEvent = GetSigEvent()
2: Event = GetEvent()
3: Event.AddToLog()
4: if SigEvent = NULL then ⊳ No Events to process in signature
5: SigEvent.Alert()
6: Exit()
7: end if
8: if Event = SigEvent and SigEvent.First = TRUE then
9: if Event.Ports= SigEvent.Ports then ⊳ Check for source, dest port match
10: SigEvent.SavedIPs= SaveIP Pair() ⊳ Save the source and destination IPs
11: SigEvent.First = FALSE
12: SigEvent = SigEvent.Next() ⊳ Get the next sig event
13: GOTO 2
14: end if
15: end if
16: if Event = SigEvent then
17: if Event.Ports= SigEvent.Ports and Event.IPs= SigEvent.SavedIPs then
18: SigEvent = SigEvent.Next()
19: GOTO 2
20: end if
21: end if
GetSigEvent() and GetEvent() returns the current event in the signature and the event trace. The results are stored
in SigEvent and Event respectively. AddToLog() saves the current event in a log ﬁle which can be used for later
manual analysis, if the detection fails. SigEvent.Alert() raises an alert if a a signature is matched. SigEvent.First()
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is set to TRUE by default. SigEvent.Next() returns the next event in the signature. SigEvent.Ports contain predeﬁned
ports for the SigEvent. SigEvent.SavedIPs is used to store a suspected pair of IPs.
4.5. Signature Generation
This section discusses the process of signature generation. Signatures are obtained by observing a common com-
munication pattern followed by different variants of the same worm. An internal network was set up between the
two hosts A and B in Virtualbox ( N.d.d). Each host was running windows xp (build 2600) with 512 mb RAM. A
worm infection is triggered from host A and the trafﬁc from host A to B is observed using a network sniffer. The
network traces for each variant are the manually examined to obtain a common communication which relates to the
worm infection phases. This method was tested for three Blaster Variants (A,G and K) ( N.d.e). A variation in the
communication pattern was expected between variants A and G, however the behaviour pattern was found to be same.
Manual signature extraction is a tedious process and requires some knowledge about worm behaviour. Automatic
extraction of signatures is to be dealt with in future work.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents a behaviour based framework for worm detection, using which the effectiveness and accuracy
of signatures can be increased. Using this framework, behavioural signatures can be generated by observing common
patterns in infection phases among different worm variants. Blaster worm was taken as an example to discuss the
process of developing signatures by taking three different variants of the worm. An anomaly based approach may be
integrated to the system as a future work.
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